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For the past 34 years, when I first came out here to go to
law school, I've been trying, in one fashion or another, to learn
about the West. Like so many before me, I tended to focus my
energies on the nineteenth century.
How seductive it was. Lewis and Clark. The mountain men.
The idealistic family journeys to farm and settle the lush
Willamette Valley. The epic gold rush. The rise of the ranch
cattle industry, a variant of Jefferson's dream but faithful to
it. Yellowstone. Yosemite. Muir.
Somewhat ironically, learning about the nineteenth century
included studying the vibrant civilizations that would be
overwhelmed by Manifest Destiny. The Mexican mission system
flourished until the War on Mexico, the Bear Flag, and the 1848
conquest treaty, called Guadalupe Hidalgo. The tribes lived free
under their own rule in the Northwest until the Stevens treaties,
in the Southwest until the Apaches were cornered, in the upper
Great Plains until the Sioux were finally closed in. It is easy
to see how the nineteenth century drew my -- our -- attention.
So many freedoms, so many conquests.
But as my learning has gone on, I find myself ever more
preoccupied with this century and the one we are about to enter.
For finally I understand that this is the century in which we
have overwhelmed the land, broad though the western landscape may
be. To be sure, during the 18 0 0s we moved a lot of earth,
rearranged rivers, inundated canyons, caused human diseases and
deaths with our poisons, and killed off many wolves, eagles, and
straw-colored bears. But the scale of our assault on the land in
this century, especially since the end of World War II, has been
magnitudes greater, so much so that comparisons can hardly be
made. Further, the pace we have put ourselves on, which is
accelerating, has generated not just questions, but also anxiety
and despair about the next century, even in optimistic people.
This is in part a matter of what we call economics but it is also
an affair of the heart and soul, for lord, how we westerners love
this large and varied, plain and wondrous, land.
One way to begin to comprehend both the highway we have
taken and the nature of the terrain that lies ahead, is to gain a
sense of the region in 1945 and compare it to today. There is
also another point in time, itself not so many years ago, and a
particular locale, that can offer perspective on the origins and
scale of these broad-shouldered accomplishments.
The din rose to an ear-shattering level at the corner of
Central and Washington, the heart of downtown, as midnight
approached on New Year's Eve. Celebrants discharged round after
round from their pistols and rifles. A steady barrage of
fireworks, many of them homemade and amounting to small bombs,
blasted holes in the dirt streets. The high, shrill whine of
steam whistles cut through the cool night air. One whistle
operator, rising to the occasion with a special flair, had
constructed an elaborate contraption with seven separate tubes,
emitting wa noise both appalling and wonderful."
Not that the town lacked for activity on normal days.
Although the population was just 5,500 and although the demands
of farming, the principal occupation in the valley, left many
residents with precious little free time, this settlement knew
how to celebrate. There were dozens of saloons. Gambling
licenses were easy to obtain and the place had attained something
of a reputation in that regard. One reporter called it "the
Monte Carlo of the Union."
But, even given the proven capability for gaiety in this
wide-open town, even given that any New Year's would be a fit
excuse for an extended bash, the excitement was at its all-time
high in Phoenix this particular evening, because a new century
was breaking across the land.
Phoenix welcomed the arrival of the twentieth century with a
spirit of buoyant optimism and ambition. It had been named the
territorial capital in 1889, wresting that honor away from
Prescott. By 1895, it had tied itself into both the Southern
Pacific line and the Santa Fe to the north. Now Phoenix had the
means to get its produce, both grains and specialty produce,
especially its oranges, to markets from coast to coast. And
Phoenicians discovered early on that the magnificent climate and
sweet citrus smells could boost a promising real estate market:
advertisements in the Arizona Republican exclaimed that "A
Princely Spot is ORANGEWOOD. Make your home among the Orange
Groves. ORANGEWOOD is the fashionable suburb of Phoenix. ..."
Yet the hard fact was that turn-of-the-century Phoenix
remained a small, dirt-road, territorial town with limited
resources. That could be changed, but hard work lay ahead and
people would have to pull together.
The city fathers faced two overriding issues. The first was
statehood. In 1863, Congress split the sprawling New Mexico
Territory, and created Arizona Territory. Any chance of
statehood, however, lay dormant for decades.
Water was the other overarching matter. Phoenix needed a
major dam on the mainstem Salt River to store the floodwaters and
put them to good use by releasing steady flows to irrigators
during the summers and dry years.
The tasks were daunting, but the timing was perfect and
Phoenix's civic leaders were able and visionary. In 1902,
Congress passed the Reclamation Act. With Benjamin Fowler and
others pushing Phoenix's proposal energetically and effectively
in Washington, D.C, Phoenix's dam-and-reservoir project on the
Salt River moved to the head of the line.
From that point on, it was a long ride but downhill all the
way. The dam, rightly named after Theodore Roosevelt, was
dedicated on March 18, 1911. Roosevelt himself did the honors.
With 350,000 cubic yards of stone cut by Italian stonemasons, the
elegant Roosevelt was the largest masonry dam in the world.
Statehood followed on the heels of Roosevelt Dam and its
nineteen-mile-long reservoir, with the long-awaited moment
falling on Valentine's Day, 1912. Although no seven-pipe steam
whistles were reported, the ceremonies eclipsed the New Year's
Eve celebration twelve years previous and even the visits of
Roosevelt and President Taft before him. Phoenix, now a town of
some 12,000 strong, had shown that it could dream its own actual
future.
Most accounts, at the turn of the century and later, remark
on Phoenix's single-minded drive and civic self-aggrandizement.
One writer called it "aggressive boosterism," and it was. But it
was also quintessentially American and western, that is, of the
American West built by Europeans. Anything and everything was
possible.
The other towns of the Southwest a century ago had much in
common with Phoenix. Los Angeles had boomed from a small
agricultural village of just 11,000 in 1880 to over 100,000 by
the beginning of the century. El Paso, the largest city in the
deep Southwest with a population of 16,000 people in 1900, had
grown into a brawny industrial and mining center along the
Mexican border with four separate railroad connections.
Albuquerque, with a big "Americanization" push, blazed the
statehood trail for New Mexico, which joined the Union in
January, 1912, five weeks before Arizona.
Salt Lake City had become the capital city of a State of the
Union in 1896, with a turn-of-the-century population of 54,000.
By 1900, the Denver area had grown to 13 6,000, twenty-fifth
largest in the nation. A reminder, though, of how fundamentally
different that frontier "metropolis" was: Denver had 800 miles
of streets, of which just twenty-four miles were paved.
Las Vegas? That future dynamo did not even exist in 1900
nor, after its founding in 1905, did it show up on the census of
1910 or 1920. The floor for qualifying as a city was 2,500
people.
Needless to say, at the close of World War II, Phoenix was
no longer a dirt-road, 5,000-person town. It had become a city
of 75,000 people, the center of a metropolitan area with a
population of 250,000. Still, it more closely resembled the
celebratory, territorial settlement of January 1, 1900, than it
did the megalopolis, pushing 3 million people, that would swarm
all over the Valley of the Sun half a century later. The civic
leaders at the end of the War, at the beginning of a whole new
time, knew what they wanted for the Phoenix area. The same was
true for all of the cities of the Southwest. They all had grown
steadily but they all wanted much, much more -- expansion of
eight, ten, twelve times, more.
I saw some of this myself, though my vantage point was
limited, when I lived in Phoenix, first getting my sea legs as a
lawyer, when the heavy aromas from the orange blossoms
intoxicated me so on mild spring evenings. Even then, in 1965,
Phoenix remained a small city, where most lawyers went to work in
slacks and no sport jackets, where you saw as many ranch hands as
lawyers downtown, and where the perfume from the orange groves
had not given way to condominiums and shopping centers.
A small city. When I made an excited call to my mother in
Michigan to tell her of my job with an excellent law firm in
Phoenix, I received a long dead space from the other end of the
line. Then she asked, truly asked: "Phoenix? Phoenix where?"
On the day I first drove into town, I wanted to go straight to
the firm's office building. Having been told that Lewis and Roca
was a "downtown firm," I stopped at a coffee shop to ask
directions. "How do you get to downtown? You're smack in the
middle of it, young fella."
The moment passed quickly, just as all moments have passed
quickly during modern Phoenix's history. When I lived there, as
at the turn of the century, the ambition was as palpable as
Camelback Mountain and the Superstitions. I knew well that the
city had just attracted a Triple A baseball team, the Phoenix
Giants, and that the civic determination was to become major
league.
I had no remote idea, though, that Phoenix had long ago
outstripped its resource base in the Salt River Valley, that
water was just then backing up against Glen Canyon Dam in order
to get electricity to Phoenix and other cities, and that the Salt
River Project, which supplied energy to metropolitan Phoenix, was
heading up various consortiums to build coal-fired power plants
in northern Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and even northwestern
Colorado. I never had any real sense of how incredibly effective
the civic and industrial leaders of Phoenix had been during the
first two-thirds of the century, nor did I know that the other
cities of the Southwest had undertaken similar pell-mell races,
finally uniting in what I would later call the Big Build-up of
the Colorado Plateau.
I never took the time to identify the plain benefits of the
West's grand undertaking -- cool, comfortable rooms for children
to grow in; room for businesses to prosper in and give us the
choices we want; peaking power to prevent brown-outs in critical-
care rooms; even beautiful artificial lakes. Nor did I
understand that the benefits would be accompanied by large, often
avoidable, costs -- subsidies that helped build government budget
deficits; drowned canyons that once gave us hanging gardens,
beauty, solitude, and Anasazi villages tying us to a past at once
different and common; wounded or destroyed runs of the quick,
strong Pacific salmon; and poisons for workers in the uranium
mines and mills and ordinary people breathing bad air.
I did not begin to comprehend, either, the many forms that
conquest can take or how much our society can accomplish in a
flicker of time, how the span of time since New Year's Day, 1900,
was just a strobe-light flash. Gaining some understanding of
those things would take a journey of thirty years. What I did
understand then was that everyone took a personal pride and stake
in Phoenix, so young and muscular, and that everyone believed
that everything was possible.
And mark it down that it worked for Phoenix and the other
Southwestern urban centers that joined together to secure large
water projects, mines, and power plants on the public's rivers
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and lands, especially on the Colorado Plateau. The Southwest's
population shot from 8 million in 1945 to 32 million in the late
1990s. Almost all of the growth was in the cities. In the West
as a whole, population in the eleven western states stood at 17
million at the end of the War. Today it has boomed to 57
million. By the year 2000, it will hit 60 million, a 350%
increase.
At the end of World War II, when the modern land rush began,
the traditional system of western water law remained intact. But
as the habitat for the law -- the social habitat as well as the
natural habitat -- began to undergo fundamental change, the law
began to reflect geographical reality, social values, and
economics.
We began to understand the costs. Burgeoning budgets. Lost
rivers. Flooded and drained wetlands. Wrecked canyons. Still
more extinguished species.
Other costs were paid disproportionately by minority
peoples. Traditional western water law never worked well for
Indians or Hispanics. Hispanic communities were forced out by
the new reclamation economics on the lower Rio Grande and flooded
out on the upper San Juan. Among the tribes, traditional ways of
life were debilitated at Pyramid Lake and Walker River, on the
salmon rivers of the Northwest, on the upper Missouri, and many
other places.
And take Black Mesa. Arizona, and the Phoenix metropolitan
area in particular, had dreamed of, and fought for, a major
diversion of Colorado River water for most of the century. The
Central Arizona Project (CAP) became a reality in the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act, one of the two principal water
and power bills of the era. Initially, electricity to pump water
on the pipeline's uphill runs was going to be generated by the
Bridge and Marble Canyon Dams, which would have flooded 146 miles
of the Grand Canyon. It was close, but public opinion rose up.
Instead, Navajo Generating Station, sited next to Glen Canyon,
would make the electricity for the CAP. The coal would come from
Black Mesa, sacred to the Hopi. In spite of the leverage the
Hopi had -- their coal was some of the best in the world and it
was the linchpin for the CAP, for the Big Build-up of the
Southwest -- Peabody Coal Company secured the coal in a
sweetheart lease that included low royalty rates and Hopi water
at the laughable rate of $1.67 an acre-foot. Now we learn, from
personal files recently opened at the University of Utah Library,
that John Boyden, the lawyer for the Hopi, represented Peabody
Coal at the same time on the same transaction.
I believe, especially given the way that events have
accelerated so quickly, and on such a large scale, that we have
responded admirably in many respects.
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In a sense, the largest trend is the way that water law has
opened up. Traditionally, water policy has always been a closed
system. Individual developers, not any government, controlled
the rivers. Government was needed only to fund and build
projects for individual developers. Water was water, separate
from land, separate from wildlife, separate from social
constraints, largely separate, in fact, from economic
constraints. Then, beginning most notably in the late 1970s and
1980s, the public showed its determination to become involved in
water decisions --a shift away from the right of individual
water developers to make unilateral decisions toward a fuller
recognition of the public interest. Although there are plenty of
remnants of the idea that water policy is a closed domain, the
dominant approach now is to treat water as one organic part of
natural resources policy, of social policy.
We have begun to change the way we make natural resource
decisions. The traditional structure has had two main layers,
general federal laws -- the Federal Power Act, the Reclamation
Acts, the Taylor Grazing Act, and modern federal statutes such as
NEPA, the Clean Water Act, and the NFMA -- and state laws, such
as water laws and state forest practices acts, which typically
were much looser. In many cases, however, we have broken the
traditional mold and moved into much more flexible, creative, and
individualized approaches focussing on specific natural systems.
The federal government is less dominant, sometimes serving mainly
as a convenor. The states and the third group of sovereigns, the
tribes, have become much more active. The new approach is
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collaborative, with all affected governments, interest groups,
and disciplines at the table.
The objective is sustainability of some natural system.
Traditional multiple use-sustained yield management measured
outputs such as acre-feet, kilowatts, board feet, and animal unit
months. Sustainability today is broadly writ, encompassing a
much broader range of things to be sustained, including salmon,
eagles, wolves, humbler animals such as voles and chubs,
archaeological sites, good rafting water, long vistas, wetlands,
open space, solitude, beauty, and the cultures of traditional
societies, whether they be Indian tribes, Hispanic towns, or
ranch and farm communities. We have rightly begun to adopt an
ambitious definition of sustainability.
We've made impressive progress in this kind of
decisionmaking, which is local not national, particular not
general, open not closed, creative not cookie-cuttered, messy not
neat. You can see it at Yellowstone, at Lake Tahoe, on the
Truckee River, in the Sacramento Bay Delta, at Mono Lake, in the
Grand Canyon, on the Clark Fork in Montana, along the Columbia
River Gorge, on the Umatilla River, in the rivers where the new
watershed councils are at work, and at numerous other places.
So we have responded to changing times and have opened up
the process to try to achieve sustainability. It is a real
accomplishment we ought to take pride in.
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Yet we have an uneasiness in our hearts and minds and
viscera about whether making collaborative decisions based on
natural systems -- valuable though the approach may be -- can be
enough in the long term. Take the groundwater situation in
metropolitan Phoenix. Arizona has taken strong, progressive
action -- the Groundwater Management Act in 198 0, the limits on
water farming in 1991, the 1995 rules on "assured water
supplies." The current groundwater overdraft is about 350,000
acre-feet, down from about 1.3 million acre-feet in 1980. Yet
the current figure is misleading because a depressed agricultural
economy has reduced the demand for water and Phoenix has had
several recent wet years. The true reduction is considerably
less. Probably the current level of overdraft is best understood
as being about 850,000.
So Phoenix remains far from safe yield, even though it is
now receiving Colorado River water. It is uncertain how much
future CAP water Phoenix can acquire from farmers and tribes.
Meanwhile, the people continue to pour in. Arizona is the
nation's third fastest-growing state.
Even water transfers, today's panaceas, can have steep costs
-- some of the same costs as old-style projects, others that we
have not learned how to address in a serious way.
Water policy is social, as well as natural resource policy.
It always has been. Transfers can take irrigated land out of
business and debilitate farm and ranch communities. We have seen
that at Owens Valley, along the Arkansas River in Colorado, and
in some Arizona rural areas before the water farming debacle was
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largely arrested in the early 1990s. Today farms up and down
the Colorado Front Range operate as tenants, waiting for Colorado
Springs, Thornton, and other cities to call in their leased
rights when new subdivisions want the water.
Water marketing can also debilitate traditional communities.
In Northern New Mexico, acequia associations -- the Hispanic
water distribution collectives -- already feel the pressure from
Albuquerque, which is growing apace with no significant water
conservation program. As a mayordomo from an acequia in the
Chama Valley told me, "Since a ditch system must be maintained by
the collective labor of its users, each time a parcel loses its
water rights, a proportionate amount of labor and ditch fees is
also lost to the system as a whole. . . . Each member is a link
in the chain of community water use and control, and each time a
member and his quota of water and labor are lost, the overall
chain is weakened." The integrity of our legal system could not
hold when it came to recognizing Hispanic ownership of their land
grants, supposedly guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
but the Hispanic communities have by and large held on to their
water. Can our system of water laws have the integrity to assure
a fair treatment of the acequias when the cities and their
developers come calling?
The uneasiness about Phoenix groundwater is replicated for
aquifers and river systems across the West. The apprehension
about transfers in Hispanic communities is found on many
reservations. Perhaps worse, the process for Indian water
settlements is in shambles, leaving those tribes without
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quantified rights wondering if they will ever see their long-
promised Winters water. The pressure to supply water for urban
growth continues to build. Seven other western states join
Arizona among the ten fastest-growing states. California is
projected to grow by more than 50%, or 17 million people, by the
year 2025. Several of the other western states are projected to
grow at even faster rates. That is 2025. What about 2050?
We know we can produce enough molecules of water for
population growth in virtually any magnitude imaginable. But we
also know that we can never escape the glare of John Wesley
Powell's stern visage. Thirteen percent of the West is desert
and most of the rest of it is arid. Water is scarce,
distinctive, valuable. Yes, we can bring enough water to the
cities for the new subdivisions but is this the wisest use and
are we willing to bear the costs? The next century will bring
different specifics than this one, but if we have learned any
lesson, it is that from now on we must ask the question we never
bothered to ask in water policy during the Big Build-up: we can
do it, but is it worth it?
The changed social, environmental, and economic situation
wrought by the population explosion since World War II has forced
westerners to broach a topic that has never before been on the
public agenda in the American West. Not just in Boulder and
Santa Fe and the Willamette Valley and Seattle and California,
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but also on the whole Colorado Front Range, the Valley of the
Sun, the Wasatch Front, Reno, the Boise Valley, and across the
rural west as well, the public is complaining, and loudly, about
population growth, the watchful and insistent raven that now
rides on the shoulder of the West.
We have already moved very quickly, in a matter of a few
years, from a time when the subject of growth was taboo into a
time of growth management. This era of planning and managing
growth will be critical. Oregon and Washington have adopted
statewide growth management systems. Many western towns and
cities, and some counties, are experimenting with growth
management. But land and water stress, the harsh statistics of
exponential growth, and common sense tell us that we must
inevitably move beyond growth management toward a time when we
confront population stabilization.
We westerners must struggle to learn how to talk about
population growth. Now, the essential dynamic is this. Some
people use the term "no-growth." Many other westerners, sensible
people, hear that term and, understandably, I think, hear:
rigid, draconian, and immediate government regulation. In turn,
many of those people -- fearing that the issue of population
growth is a short, direct freeway to wrong-headed regulation --
deny that there is a problem. And so we talk past each other.
In fact, rampant population growth is. a problem, a
desperately serious and accelerating problem that is tearing away
at everything the West is, but it cannot be solved by slogans
like "no-growth." Nor, though some government action, especially
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at the local level, will be needed, can regulation solve it. For
there are profound and complex questions of economic opportunity;
of economic, social, and racial equity; of personal choice of
place and family; of our nation's historic commitment to leaving
our door open to people from other nations; and many others.
Further, all of these issues reach beyond the West to the rest of
the nation and the world.
So population growth, of all issues, is not one for this
day's slogans. It is one for a whole, long generation -- I pray
that it is ours -- and all the diligence, patience,
openmindedness, creativity, courage, and cooperation that we can
muster. For this is an encompassing social issue that you can
approach only piece by piece, in a thousand arenas or more,
including such things as: walking the paper, and glass, and
plastic out to the curb for recycling; adopting sensible local
land-use planning; achieving coordinated state and regional
planning, where appropriate; disseminating respectful family
planning information the world over; and, perhaps most of all,
engaging in open discussions over coffee and next-door fences and
in public arenas over the very issue so that we can gradually
build a civic and individual will to act.
For is it not our responsibility to act, even if it be
incremental? Can we citizens of the West do again, in the next
two generations, what we did in the two generations since the
great War and still have the West? Is it not our calling to make
this so-called New West a beginning of a true time, not so much
of restraint, but also of civility?
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The water community has always prided itself in taking the
long view. Water and population growth have always been
extricably entwined in the West, and always will be.
Have we taken the lead? Have we told the people straight
and true that we can only squeeze the system so far and so long?
That we can't grow indefinitely and still get all the things we
want out of our rivers?
Have we told the public the truth about water supplies and
population growth and 2 025? About 2050?
Have we set out all the costs, tangible and intangible? Has
the water community gone a step farther and explained that the
costs for water cannot be isolated, that in trying to advise the
public of the whole cost of growth that we must aggregate the
cost of water with other growth-related costs, such as roads,
schools, and prisons? Must not such information, on an
aggregated basis, be available for policymaking if we are serious
about achieving sustainability in the West?
Let me describe one proposal that exemplifies the kind of
work we might do. A petition to Vice President Gore, endorsed by
an impressive group of signatories, calls for a National Optimum
Population Commission. The idea is to join together and gain
some understanding of how many people the West can sustain -- or,
variously put, what the carrying capacity or optimum population
is. Surely such an effort, whether it encompasses only the West
or it is a national study that squarely addresses the distinctive
problems of this region, might lay an important part of the
foundation for the future.
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For in looking toward the future, our society is quite good
at striving to provide the hard deliverables and the
infrastructure -- highways, energy, water, minerals -- while we
leave aside the softer, gentler, more intangible concerns of the
years to come. Take a morning, the kind Bill Kittredge calls a
bluebird morning, a beginning day of spring 2 5 or 50 years from
now, a morning when the canyon wren of the Southwest desert is
ready to sing her song, when the fragrance of sage is about to
fill up the plains, when the salmon are poised to surge up the
river. What legacy do we want to leave, or, put another way, how
many options do we want to foreclose for those people? What do
we want the lives of the people in our society to be like on a
day like that? How crowded, safe, and healthy will their day be?
How hectic? How happy for a child? And, fundamentally, though
it is their time of year, their moment, will the wren and sage
and salmon be abundant and healthy? Surely human population and
its attendant costs will be key determinants in how those
questions are answered.
A study of carrying capacity inevitably would be imprecise.
Among many other things, the natural world is changing, and so is
our technology, so that our estimates of carrying capacity would
have to be regularly reviewed. Perhaps a study of carrying
capacity would be only a rough cut, just as studies of our hard
deliverables are. Still, the information would help give us a
context.
Another aspect of coming to grips with population growth, in
conjunction with information about carrying capacity, would be
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for urban areas to develop alternative future growth profiles.
Suppose metropolitan Phoenix builds out from 3 million people to
4 million. How will that be accomplished? What will be the
costs for water and the rest of the growth-related
infrastructure? What will be the costs if Phoenix builds out to
5, 6, or 8 million? Again, the estimates would be rough but they
would be extremely useful: when laid against estimates of
carrying capacity, they would surely influence growth management
decisions and help educate the people.
We assert that we are determined to achieve sustainability.
Sustainability, however defined, is a function of the vitality of
natural systems; human population; and the rates of human
production and human consumption. How can we pretend to be
seeking sustainability without accounting for the number of
people who will be producing, consuming, and impacting natural
systems?
It is my belief that we may be in the beginning stages of
addressing population stabilization. We are now discussing
growth. Societal action always begins with a societal
discussion.
Once the context is understood, actions will follow. The
largest sphere of progress will be in individual actions, as a
new ethic takes hold. Government action will be less important.
We are a practical people and proposals involving sterilization,
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legal limits on the numbers of children a person can bear, and
euthanasia for the elderly run contrary to deeply-held moral
values and are excessive. Rather, my guess is that the main
roles for formal law will lie in creating tax disincentives for
population growth; reducing but not eliminating immigration; and
adopting sensible local, regional, and state growth management
practices so that human population levels will be consistent with
sustainability in this arid land.
But we should accelerate the discussion and resolutely move
toward action. We fool ourselves if we abdicate and say that
population growth will come anyway, that "you can't stop growth."
Much to the contrary, population stabilization absolutely will
come. The only questions are when, under what circumstances, and
whether we choose to influence the outcome.
You can see some hopeful signs in terms of action as well as
discussion. Americans are voluntarily having fewer children. So
are people in many other nations. The recent local and state
growth management efforts are encouraging. So are the open,
collaborative approaches toward resolving disputes over water,
always the West's toughest resource issue. All of these efforts
demonstrate the burgeoning interest in what we call
sustainability but what is really just an elemental civility
toward ourselves and the land and waters that give us so many
different kinds of sustenance.
Perhaps, above all, we are beginning to understand that 50
years ago, the end of the Great War, or 100 years ago, when the
century broke across Phoenix, was a short time ago and that 25,
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50, or 100 years in the future is a short time away. We need to
try, in our own small ways, to take concrete steps to fulfill
obligations that have fallen to us to see that the western
landscape and the human spirit here, here in this sacred place,
will flourish during the many years to come.
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